Military Staff Systems Today—A Result of Historical Processes
In 1887 the British military writer Spenser Wilkinson published his essay The Brain of an Army, A Popular Account of the German General Staff. In the introduction to the second edition of 1895, we find the following remarkable statement:
It may well be doubted whether this feature of the Prussian (General Staff) System is suitable for imitation elsewhere. The Germans themselves regard it as accidental rather than essential, for in organizing their Navy they have, after much experiment and deliberation, adopted a different plan.'
If one compares the allied armed forces in NATO superficially, it seems as if there was a complete consensus about the axioms of staff work and military leadership. In the center, there are the individual leaders at the different levels of command, internally independent men, who take decisions, commit themselves, and, by means of their example, lead their men in peace and war. The higher the levels of command, the greater the responsibility, and, in consequence, the bigger the staffs. These staffs relieve the military leaders of the load of administrative details of everyday business. They work up the facts for their decisions, then implement their orders and supervise the execution. However, if officers assigned to NATO take a closer look, they recognize that the views of military leadership and the roles and functions of staff officers and their relationship with their commanders differ considerably. These differences, as well as the staff organizations of the allied armed forces and their role as an instrument of military leadership, are the result of historical processes that took different courses. The correlation of leaders and staffs in armed forces can be assessed with certainty only if one knows the roots of the different staff systems. These systems have developed for generations in the respective military political environment of the individual nations and, adapted to our times, continue to have an effect into the present.
When I was a student at the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College and later during my assignment to Headquarters, Allied Forces Central Europe, I was often asked about the Prussian-German General Staff System by allied comrades-in-arms. They wanted to know if it still had an effect on the Bundeswehr today. At the U.S. Army War College, I was asked the same questions. I realized that my fellow soldiers admired the efficiency of the Prussian-German General Staff as demonstrated in the German Unification Wars of the 19th century and in the two World Wars, even without knowing its peculiarities. The reason for this lack of knowledge obviously results from the following phenomenon.
In the introduction to his book, The Imperial and Royal Austrian Army 1848-1914, The Lost Wehrmacht. Christoph Allmeyer Beck, a famous Austrian military author, writes that it is an Austrian phenomenon that something that has been declared de jure nonexistent, simply continues to exist elsewhere in his country. He further states that many things that came into being out of a fine tissue of historical events, intellectual trends and emotional attitudes, would often lead a strange underground existence, trickling up to the surface time and again, thus continuing to exist even into the present. Anyone who attempts to describe the characteristics of the Prussian-German General Staff System, its influence on everyday business and the way that Bundeswehr General Staff officers see themselves, will be reminded of this observation of Austrian reality.
The functions and responsibilities of the German General Staff officer were last compiled and issued as an order in the classified Manual for General Staff Service in Wartime (Handbuch fuer den Generalstabsdienst im Kriege) in 1939. The methods and tasks described within were applied almost unchanged in the Bundeswehr until the publication of the second revised edition of the Army Regulation TF/G 7?, HDv 100/100 "Command and Control of Armed Forces" (Truppenfuehrung) in September 1987. There appears in this regulation, for the first time, a concise paragraph which explains the functions and responsibilities of the Bundeswehr General Staff officer. Paragraph 615 states:
The commander must be supported by obedient, independent and critical advising General Staff officers ("Fuehrergehilfen"). They provide him with information and advice, prepare decisions, turn them into orders and measures and supervise their execution. If necessary, they urge the commander to decide and act. Their thinking and actions must be guided by his will and intentions and must be determined by his decisions and orders.
Past authors who wrote about the Prussian-German General Staff System mostly concentrated on the macrocosm of the organization of the former German General Staffs, their leading figures, and their relationship with the highest military and political leadership. Analyses of the microcosm of the Prussian-German General Staff officers were not neglected, but never given the depth of research and attention as to its micro aspects. To date, there is no publication that analyzes the characteristics of the General Staff officers of the Bundeswehr in light of history, their work within NATO staffs and the current challenges which were initiated by the revolutionary developments in Eastern Europe and in Germany since 1989. Many authors terminated their research with the unconditional surrender of the Wehrmacht in 1945.
This essay is designed to help remedy this unsatisfactory situation and to stimulate discussion. This seems to be necessary for two important reasons. First, Germany will stay in NATO. German General Staff officers will continue to work for allied superiors. Consequently, allied officers should have an understanding of the peculiarities of their German subordinates. This will become increasingly important since allied forces in Europe will consist overwhelmingly of multinational corps made up of national units. This means that the degree of cooperation among German General Staff officers, their allied superiors, subordinates, and their fellow soldiers will increase. Second, in the Bundeswehr a diminution in the education of young officers about German history can be observed. At the present time, Ernst Moritz Arndt's statement in his Catechism for the German Warrior (Katechismus fuer den deutschen Kriegs-und Wehrmann) of 1813 is therefore especially true for the German General Staff officer who exercises considerable power in the armed forces of today. "Where history is not available, man faces his present empty-handed. Thus, he hardly recognizes a way into the future because he has lost sight of where he came from."' Fundamentally, a professional group is only able to develop a concept of itself, introduce its peculiarities into everyday work and to act proactively, if it is aware of its roots and foundations, and recognizes how these influence the present. One who knows the foundations of his profession and is able to articulate them is invulnerable to misinterpretation and professional criticism.
These statements provide a guideline for the structure of this evaluation. After some reflections on the phenomenon of the Prussian-German General Staff System, the General Staff officers of the Bundeswehr will be portrayed. The organizational roots of these peculiarities will be pointed out by discussing their history. This discussion will include only examples of how the activities of former General Staff officers affect the Bundeswehr General Staff officers and how they see themselves and their working methods. In doing so there is a risk of "open flanks," as historical developments will only be shown insofar as they have had impact on the German General Staff officers of today. For example, this means that the Wehrmacht Air Force General Staff and German Admiral Staff officers will not be discussed in depth because the cradle of General Staff officer was in the German Armies of the past. In the concluding section a discussion of problem areas concerning deficits and demands which face the German General Staff officer today, and in the future, will be presented. A summary and some recommendations on a better use of the Prussian-German General Staff system to the benefit of a transformed NATO will conclude this evaluation.