In 1813 after Scharnhorst died from a septic wound, his fellow reformer, General Neidhardt August Wilhelm von Gneisenau, was assigned as the Quartermaster General, i.e., the chief of the General Staff. Gneisenau has been recognized as the first "great Chief of Staff" in the history of the Prussian-German General Staff. He institutionalized the right of the commander's adviser to take part in command and control by advising the commander until he makes a decision. He conceded to General Staff officers of major formations the right to contact directly the Chief of the General Staff in all matters of their functional areas. Not all of the Prussian military leaders agreed with the concept. General von York, for example, never wanted to accept Gneisenau's position as the first adviser to General von Bluecher. Nevertheless, the good harmony mentioned earlier between Bluecher and Scharnhorst during the withdrawal from the French Army, henceforth became the institutionalized right of Prussian-German General Staff officers; namely, to advise their commanders and assume joint responsibility for their actions. This resulted in joint responsibility for commanders' decisions and the exercise of command and control of General Staff chiefs from army corps level upwards. Up to 1938, it was an unwritten law that army corps Chiefs of General Staffs were permitted to enter in the war diaries their opinions when they differed from the responsible commander's decision. From 1938 the Chief of the General Staff of Army, General of the Artillery Franz Halder, restricted this right in a sensible way, as will be argued later in this essay. The responsibility for the relevance of his advice has remained with the General Staff officer of the Bundeswehr.
Gneisenau also became the founder of Auftragstaktik. He was the first to develop command and control by directives, thus giving latitude to the subordinate commanders for the execution of operations. Subordinate commanders were for the first time issued directives expressing the intent of the Royal headquarters in terms of clear objectives, but giving only general indications of the methods of their achievement. This enabled commanders and their General Staff officers to use initiative in taking advantage of unforeseen opportunities, provided that their actions were consistent with the main objective. Thus, Gneisenau laid the cornerstone of the German leadership philosophy: mission-oriented command and control.
Consolidation of the Prussian General Staff System
In the period between Napoleon's defeat in 1815 and the year 1857, when General Helmut von Moltke became Chief of the Prussian General Staff, the following historic milestones are of importance. In 1821 the Quartermaster General Staff was renamed the General Staff (Generalstab). Since the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General von Mueffling, had more years in service than the Prussian War Minister, Major General Ruehle von Lilienstern, the Prussian King separated the General Staff from the Ministry of War. The Chief of the General Staff, however, remained subordinate to the War Minister and continued to be his adviser in operational matters. This separation of the General Staff from the Ministry of War was the first step to the complete independence of the Prussian General Staff.
Starting in 1817, 16 General Staff officers served in the Prussian Ministry of War and 6 General Staff officers worked in the main embassies. Each army corps had one Chief of General Staff and two other General Staff officers. The Chief of the General Staff was the immediate superior of all General Staff officers of the Prussian Army. The General Staff officers posted to the Ministry of War served in the "Great General Staff," (Grosser Generalstab), the General Staff officers of unit staffs were called "Line General Staff Officers," (Truppengeneralstab). In 1821 the General Staff officers received special uniform insignia which have been retained to the present day.
Scharnhorst's aim to open up the top army careers to all scientifically trained officers without regard to their social background was initiated in the General Staff of the Prussian Army at a time when the concept of selection based on merit had not gained general acceptance in the Prussian officer corps and other state agencies. This opportunity allowed the induction of a number of outstanding officers. For instance, General von Clausewitz's nobility was based on a falsification by his step-grandfather. King Frederick Wilhelm III later acknowledged his nobility when the general and his brothers had attained great achievements. The nobility of Field Marshal Count von Gneisenau also was a falsification. The King nevertheless promoted him to Field Marshal and bestowed countship upon him. General von Krauseneck, who was the Chief of the General Staff from 1829 to 1848, was the son of a Brandenburg organ player and had been promoted from the ranks. General von Rheyer, Chief of the Prussian General Staff from 1848 to 1857 was a shepherd in his youth. Owing to his brilliant military achievements he became an officer and was later given a title of nobility.
This phenomenon is also one of the historical roots of today's General Staff officer for, within the Federal Republic of Germany, academic titles take the place of the higher status inherited by noble birth in former times. In the Bundeswehr, where the Officers Corps is heterogeneous as far as origin and education are concerned, all regular officers have to pass through the same selective procedure to become a General Staff officer. Academic education and titles do not grant any visible advantages.